The Coalition
for Voting Integrity, representing thousands of Pennsylvania voters very concerned about the lack of transparency and true citizen
involvement in elections in recent years, supports passing legislation that amends the Election Code to mandate voter-marked
paper ballots and statistically significant audits.
We
support HB 53 and SB 247, amendments to the Election Code, but only if vital changes are made prior to passage. The most important change is to Section 1(a) (4.1), which reads as follows:
“The voting system (pursuant to Section 1112.1-A), shall PRODUCE or require the use of an individual VOTER-VERIFIED
PAPER RECORD of the voter’s vote that shall be made available for inspection or/and verification by the voter before
the voter’s vote is cast.”
PROBLEM
The words
“PRODUCE” and “RECORD” in the cited section allow the paper record from printers
attached to Direct Record Electronic (DRE) voting systems to be used, which problematic on many levels. The “voter-verified” paper audit trail (VVPAT) or record produced on a
DRE is often not voter-verified (studies show most voters don’t check or are
unable to see errors). Inadequate audit protocols insure that only a fraction of paper records are counted as ballots. Since
the vote that is actually tallied is cast on the machine via software programming, unverified by voter, both methods may produce
conflicting or inaccurate election results. Allowing such a “solution” to become law does nothing to correct the
many problems facing our election system today.
SOLUTION
Delete the
words “produce or” from the bill, and change “voter-verified paper record” to “VOTER-MARKED
PAPER BALLOT.” If the voter marks his own ballot prior to casting,
it is inherently voter-verified in one easy step. Such a voter-marked ballot
can be counted on an optical scan, or hand-counted with no confusion about voter intent. These physical, software-independent
ballots are saved and can be used for recounts and meaningful audits, as the official vote-of-record. Section 2 (b) (4), which would permit the unreliable DRE
printout to be the vote-of-record, should also be deleted.
Changes need
to be made to audit provisions in the bill also. A valid audit, however, must begin with a VOTER-MARKED PAPER BALLOT.